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Real Property
by Linda S. Finley*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article surveys developments in Georgia real property law
between June 1, 2018 and May 31, 2019. 1 The Article covers noteworthy
cases decided during this period by the Georgia Supreme Court, the
Georgia Court of Appeals, the United States District Courts, and the
United States Bankruptcy Court and includes information about
legislation enacted during the survey period which affects real property
law.2
II. LEGISLATION
The 2019 regular session of the Georgia General Assembly adjourned
sine die concluding its forty-day legislative session shortly after
midnight on Tuesday, April 2, 2019. 3 Although further legalization of
marijuana and the enactment of cannabis-related legislation legalizing
limited in-state cultivation, production, manufacturing, sale, and

*Shareholder, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. Mercer
University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 1981). Member, State
Bars of Georgia and Florida; United States District Courts for the Northern District of
Georgia, Middle District of Georgia, Southern District of Georgia, Northern District of
Florida, and Middle District of Florida; United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit; Supreme Court of the United States. The Author wishes to give special thanks to
Beatrice Teta Bacilieri for handling the many administrative tasks necessary to bring this
Survey Article to print.
1. For an analysis of real property law during the prior survey period, see Linda S.
Finley, Real Property, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 70 MERCER L. REV. 209 (2018).
2. An additional resource for reviewing real property case law during the survey
period is: Carol V. Clark, 2019 Judicial Update, 2019 Real Prop. Law Inst. (Institute of
Continuing Legal Education in Georgia (2019).
3. Legislative Update Weeks 9—10 (04.08.19), STATE BAR OF GEORGIA,
https://www.gabar.org/committeesprogramssections/programs/leg/weekly_updates.cfm
(last visited Oct. 24, 2019).
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purchase of low-THC CBD oil4 was perhaps the most talked about
legislation during the session, real property law was not ignored.
Very basic, but important to every real estate practitioner, is the
statutory amendment to add section 9-15-4(f)5 to the Official Code of
Georgia, which increases recording fees that the clerk of superior court
may charge and provides for a flat fee per instrument (in most
instances) rather than a per page fee. The cost for recording most real
estate instruments shall be twenty-five dollars.6 The types of
instruments where the flat fee is applicable “includ[e], but [are] not
limited to, each deed, deed of trust, affidavit, release, notice, certificate,
cancellation, assignment, notice of filing for Uniform Commercial Code
related real estate, and assignment of a security deed of mortgage.” 7
Likewise, liens upon real estate and personal property, hospital liens,
lis pendens, information on utilities, cancellations, and a writ of fieri
facias will also carry a twenty-five dollar flat fee.8 The fee changes
become effective January 1, 2020.9
The Georgia Landlord Tenant Law10 was amended to add a new
provision11 prohibiting retaliation by a landlord against a tenant who
reports unsafe or unhealthy conditions of a property. 12 A violation can
be established if a tenant demonstrates that he or she alerted the
landlord about repair or a property condition affecting the health or
safety of the tenants or the habitability of the property,13 that the
tenant, in good faith,14 complained to a governmental body who enforces
building or housing codes,15 or that the tenant attempted to establish or
participated in a tenant organization formed to address property
conditions.16 The landlord violates the statute if, within three months
after the tenant takes action, a retaliatory eviction is filed 17 or if the
4. Ga. H.R. Bill 324, Reg. Sess. (2019) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 31-2A-18, O.C.G.A.
§ 16-12-191).
5. O.C.G.A. § 9-15-4 (2019).
6. Ga. H.R. Bill 288, Reg. Sess. (2019) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 9-15-4, O.C.G.A.
§ 19-8-13).
7. Id. § 2(f)(1)(A)(i).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 8.
10. O.C.G.A. tit. 44 ch. 7 (2019).
11. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24 (2019).
12. Ga. H.R. Bill 346, Reg. Sess. (2019) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24).
13. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(b)(2) (2019).
14. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(b)(3)(B) (2019).
15. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(b)(3) (2019).
16. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(b)(4) (2019).
17. O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(c)(1) (2019).
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landlord deprives the tenant from using the premises,18 halts services to
the tenant provided under the lease agreement (such as utilities), 19
increases the tenant’s rent, terminates the lease agreement, 20 or
generally interferes with the rights provided the tenant under the
terms of the lease.21 Retaliation by the landlord is a defense to an
eviction action and, if successful in proving that the landlord’s action
was willful, wanton, or malicious, the tenant may recover a civil penalty
against the landlord equal to one month’s rent, plus an award of $500
for court costs and reasonable attorney’s fees, less delinquent rents, or
other sums to which the landlord is entitled. 22 The landlord may invoke
a rebuttable defense if, within a prior twelve-month period, the
property has been inspected by federal, state, or local agencies which
certify that the property complies with applicable building and housing
codes.23 Furthermore, the landlord is not liable for retaliation when rent
or other sums due are increased pursuant to the terms of the lease, 24 on
account of a reduction of services for an entire residential building or
complex,25 or on account of the provisions regulated by a state or federal
housing program.26 Defenses against an alleged retaliatory eviction
include proof that the tenant was delinquent in payment of the rent
when the landlord gives notice to vacate or files an eviction action; 27
that the tenant intentionally damages the property or threatens
violence against the landlord, its employees, or another tenant; 28 that
the tenant breached the lease provisions concerning serious misconduct
or criminal acts;29 or if the tenant remains in the property after giving
the landlord a notice of termination or intent to vacate the premises. 30
In other legislation affecting eviction law, O.C.G.A. § 44-7-931 was
amended to create a deadline for parties who have received a writ of
possession to obtain execution of the writ. The statute provides that
application for execution must be made within thirty days of issuance of
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(c)(2) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(c)(3) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(c)(4) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(c)(5) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(e) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(f) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(d)(1)(A) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(d)(1)(B) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(d)(1)(C) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(d)(2)(A) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(d)(2)(B) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(d)(2)(C) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-24(d)(2)(D) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-9 (2019).
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the writ of possession unless the application is accompanied by an
affidavit showing good cause for the delay. 32 The failure to timely apply
for execution of the writ requires the applicant to reapply for a writ of
possession.33 The amendment creates a definition for “application for
execution of a writ of possession” as that “request or application for a
sheriff, constable, or marshal to execute a writ of possession which was
issued pursuant to this article”34 and restates that the writ of
possession is the legal instrument issued by the court to recover
possession of property in an eviction proceeding.35
In an effort to protect Georgia beaches, House Bill 445 36 revised
multiple provisions of state law relating to protection of dunes. O.C.G.A.
§ 12-5-23237 was revised to redefine certain terms used in managing the
shoreline. “Dynamic dune field” is now defined as “those elements of the
sand-sharing system including the dynamic area of beach and sand
dunes, varying in height and width, but does not include stable sand
dunes.”38 The revision changes the definition of “ocean boundary of the
dynamic dune field” as “extend[ing] to the ordinary high-water mark as
determined by the [D]epartment [of Natural Resources].” 39 The
determination of the landward boundary of the dynamic dune field is
made more specific and grandfathers in structures existing on July 1,
1979.40
Giving further guidelines for construction over or near dunes is the
definition of “minor activity” such as “installation of decks, patios, or
porches or the alteration of native landscaping” which do not impact
more than one-third of the parcel, or “construction or installation of
elevated crosswalks providing access across sand dunes and shoreline
stabilization activities.”41
In order to determine where construction can take place on the
beach, the definition of “[o]rdinary high-water mark” was amended to
mean “the upper reach of the tide along the shore established by the
fluctuations of water and indicated by physical characteristics such as a
clear natural line impressed on the shore, shelving, changes in the

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

O.C.G.A. § 44-7-55(d) (2019).
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-49(1) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 44-7-49(2) (2019).
Ga. H.R. Bill 445, Reg. Sess. (2019) (codified at O.C.G.A. § 12-5-232).
O.C.G.A. § 12-5-232 (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 12-5-232(8) (2019).
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 12-5-232(10.1) (2019).
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character of soil, or the presence of litter and debris.” 42 “Sand dunes” is
now defined as the “mounds of sand within the sand-sharing system
deposited along a coastline by wind, tidal, or wave action, or by beach
nourishment or dune construction” and includes the areas covered by
native vegetation.43
The amendment also created the Shore Protection Committee within
the Department of Natural Resources. 44 This committee is composed of
five members including the commissioner of natural resources and four
other people. Three of the four appointed members must be residents of
Camden, Glynn, McIntosh, Liberty, Bryan, or Chatham county. 45 The
committee is authorized to issue orders and to grant, suspend, modify,
or deny permits for construction that affect the dunes. 46 The remainder
of the legislation amends O.C.G.A. § 12-5-23847 and empowers and
instructs the committee regarding how it will make determinations.
III. TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY48
Republic Title Company, LLC v. Andrews49 highlights important
procedural distinctions between the two types of quiet title remedies
found in Georgia: conventional quiet title set out at O.C.G.A.
§ 23-3-40,50 and quiet title against “all the world” set out at O.C.G.A.
§ 23-3-60.51 Conventional quiet title sounds in equity, and therefore
venue is controlled by Article VI, § II, paragraph III of the Georgia
Constitution: venue is proper in the county where at least one
defendant resides.52 Quieting title against “all the world” is a
proceeding taken directly against the property to establish title to land,

42. O.C.G.A. § 12-5-232(11) (2019).
43. O.C.G.A. § 12-5-232(15) (2019).
44. O.C.G.A. § 12-5-235(a) (2019).
45. Id.
46. O.C.G.A. § 12-5-235(b) (2019).
47. O.C.G.A. § 12-5-238 (2019).
48. This section was authored by Teresa L. Bailey. Teresa Bailey LLC. University of
Florida (B.A., 1983); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1986). Member, State Bar of
Georgia; United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; United States District
Courts for the Northern District of Georgia, Middle District of Georgia, and Southern
District of Georgia.
49. 347 Ga. App. 463, 819 S.E.2d 889 (2018).
50. O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-40–23-3-44 (2019).
51. O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-60–23-3-73 (2019).
52. Republic Title, 347 Ga. App. at 465, 819 S.E.2d at 891–92.
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making the case in rem.53 As such, venue is proper where the property
is situated.54
In Republic Title, Andrews brought an equitable quiet-title petition,
but filed suit in the county where the property was located and not
where any of the respondent–defendants resided.55 Republic Title filed a
motion to dismiss the matter for improper venue, which was denied by
the trial court. Thereafter, summary judgment was granted to Andrews.
Republic Title appealed.56
In its sole enumeration of error, Republic Title claimed that the trial
court erred in denying its motion to dismiss because proper venue was
not in the county where the property was located but was proper only in
a county where a defendant could be served. The court of appeals
reversed the trial court, pointing out that the two statutes governing
quiet title were “entirely distinct from each other.” 57 Since Andrews
characterized her petition as a “conventional quia timet,” did not frame
the action as against the property itself, and since she named two
individuals and specific deeds she sought removed as clouds on her title,
the court held the action was properly prosecuted as a conventional
quiet title, requiring it to be brought in the county where at least one of
the respondents resided.58 Accordingly, summary judgment was
improper.59
The case Republic Title Company, LLC v. Freeport Title and
Guaranty, Inc.,60 involved a dispute over excess funds generated from a
2017 tax sale of real property in Fulton County. Freeport, the owner of
the property at the time of the tax sale, filed a money rule complaint
against the sheriff to recover the excess funds, and Republic intervened
claiming to be entitled to the excess funds because of its recorded
security deed. Freeport amended its petition to include a claim to quiet
title under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40, to remove the Republic security deed as
a cloud on Freeport’s title. Freeport claimed that title to the property
had reverted to Freeport in 2014 as a matter of law.61

53. Id. at 465, 819 S.E.2d at 892.
54. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-62 (2019).
55. Republic Title, 347 Ga. App. at 463, 819 S.E.2d at 890.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 464, 819 S.E.2d at 891 (citing with approval Patel v. Patel, 342 Ga. App. 81,
90, 802 S.E.2d 871, 878 (2017)).
58. Id. at 466, 819 S.E.2d at 892.
59. Id. at 468–69, 819 S.E.2d at 894.
60. 829 S.E.2d 172 (Ga. Ct. App. 2019).
61. Id. at 173.
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Under O.C.G.A § 44-14-80,62 title to real property conveyed as
security for repayment of a debt reverts to the grantor at the expiration
of seven years from the date of maturity of the debt unless the security
deed recites that the parties intended to create a perpetual or indefinite
security interest in the real property.63 Republic’s security deed
contained a fixed maturity date of 2007. Accordingly, title reverted to
Freeport in 2014, three years before the date of the tax sale. 64
A special master appointed in the case found that title reverted to
Freeport as a matter of law, and Freeport was entitled to the excess
funds. The trial court adopted the special master’s report, and Republic
appealed.65
Republic made three arguments on appeal but did not enumerate as
error the ruling that title to the property had reverted to Freeport.
First, Republic argued that the special master exceeded the scope of the
special master’s jurisdiction in making a finding concerning the excess
funds.66 The court of appeals determined that, although the special
master has complete jurisdiction within the scope of the pleadings “to
ascertain and determine the validity, nature, or extent of petitioner’s
title and all other interests in the land,” 67 the trial court must
independently determine the correctness of the special master’s report
before adopting it as the court’s judgment.68 As such, the trial court, not
the special master, ordered disbursement of the funds to Freeport.
Since Republic could demonstrate no harm, the court of appeals
determined that it did not need to pass on whether it was appropriate
for the special master to opine about the disbursement of the excess
funds.69
Republic next argued that Freeport lacked standing to petition to
quiet title since Freeport was required to possess a freehold estate or an
estate for years (with at least five years remaining) at the time the
petition was filed. The court of appeals found that conventional quiet
title requires a petitioner to allege and prove possession in itself at the
time of filing of the petition.70 The requirement to possess a freehold
estate or an estate for years, while a requirement for a quiet title action

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

O.C.G.A § 44-14-80 (2019).
Freeport Title, 829 S.E.2d at 174 n.4.
Id. at 174.
Id.
Id.
O.C.G.A. §§ 23-3-43, 23-3-66 (2019).
Freeport Title, 829 S.E.2d at 174.
Id. at 174–75.
Id. at 175–76.
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against all the world, it is not a requirement of conventional quiet title.
Freeport filed its petition to quiet title within the twelve-month
redemption period under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-40. Freeport’s title as owner of
the property was not divested, and the tax sale purchaser had no right
to possession. The court of appeals held Freeport therefore had standing
to pursue its quiet title claims.71
In Bowen v. Laird,72 as part of a land deal where Bowen purchased
property from Laird, Bowen conveyed an 8.45-acre tract to Laird that
adjoined another property Laird owned. Thereafter, Bowen conveyed
3,000 acres to The Highlands at Clear Creek, LLC (HCC) that
mistakenly included the 8.45-acre tract Bowen had previously conveyed
to Laird. HCC subdivided the property it acquired from Bowen. The
8.45-acre tract was subdivided into eight lots, four of which HCC sold to
third parties.73
In 2007, Laird noticed that his property tax bill identified the taxable
property as fifty-seven acres rather than the sixty-five acres he believed
he owned. Laird inquired into the matter and discovered the
conveyance of the 8.45-acre tract to HCC. Laird brought the issue to
Bowen’s attention, and it was determined that the title examination
conducted by the attorney who closed the transaction to HCC missed
the deed from Bowen conveying the property to Laird. The parties
attempted to work out a remedy without litigation, but ultimately Laird
filed suit to quiet title against Bowen, HCC, the owners of the four lots,
and their lenders. Laird also asserted a claim for attorney’s fees. 74
In response to the suit, Bowen admitted that he had no claim to the
disputed property, that he had erroneously included the 8.45-acre tract
in the later conveyance to HCC, and that he did not own that property
at the time he conveyed it to HCC. Bowen, however, disputed that Laird
was entitled to attorney’s fees.75
HCC, the four lot owners, and their lenders responded to the petition
and crossclaimed among the defendants. Laird filed for summary
judgment on the title issue, but not on the claim for attorney’s fees. The
defendants opposed the motion and requested that the special master
issue a report. The special master concluded that Laird held fee simple
title to the 8.45-acre tract and that the conveyance by Bowen to HCC,
and all subsequent conveyances were clouds on Laird’s title, and should
be removed. In 2010, the trial court entered a decree quieting title in
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 176.
348 Ga. App. 1, 821 S.E.2d 105 (2018).
Id. at 1–2, 821 S.E.2d at 107.
Id. at 2, 821 S.E.2d at 107–08.
Id. at 2, 821 S.E.2d at 108.
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favor of Laird, but preserved for later resolution all other claims
between the parties including the claims for attorney’s fees and
crossclaims between the defendants.76
Almost seven years later, the issue of bad faith attorney’s fees77 was
tried by a jury against Bowen only.78 Although the jury found no bad
faith on the part of Bowen, it nonetheless awarded Laird $78,266 in fees
for “unnecessary trouble and expense.”79 Bowen filed a motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), which was denied by the
trial court. Bowen appealed.80
In reversing the trial court’s denial of Bowen’s motion for JNOV, the
court of appeals noted that a petition to quiet title under O.C.G.A.
§ 23-3-60 is an action in rem, not against a person or entity, and the
statute does not specifically authorize an award of attorney’s fees. 81
Since the jury found no bad faith in the transaction between Bowen and
Laird, the court turned to the issue of “unnecessary trouble and
expense,” which the court explained as a defendant forcing a plaintiff to
sue where no bona fide controversy existed.82
The court held that since there were duplicate conveyances of the
8.45-acre tract, there was a bona fide controversy regarding title to that
property, and Laird was required to file to quiet title. 83 Bowen had no
claim to the property at the time suit was filed and admitted the same
in his answer. The jury’s verdict awarding fees against Bowen was
premised on the fact that Bowen’s second conveyance of the property to
HCC created the problem, and that it would be fair for Bowen to pay
Laird’s fees.84 The court of appeals stated, however, “the mere fact that
a defendant’s action has caused an issue which later requires litigation
to correct does not in and of itself provide a basis for the award of
attorney fees.”85 The losing party ought not to be burdened with the
attorney’s fees of the other party where there is a bona fide controversy
unless there has been “wanton or excessive indulgence in litigation.”86

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (2019).
Bowen, 348 Ga. App. at 3, 821 S.E.2d at 108.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 3–4, 821 S.E.2d at 108.
Id. at 4, 821 S.E.2d at 109.
Id. at 5, 821 S.E.2d at 109.
Id. at 5, 821 S.E.2d 109–10.
Id. at 5, 821 S.E.2d at 110.
Id. at 6, 821 S.E.2d at 110.
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In White v. Gens,87 Nicholle Gens (Gens), as Administrator of the
Estate of April Gens, filed suit to quiet title against John White and
others (collectively, White) claiming ownership of a residential lot in
Forsyth County. White counterclaimed seeking to reform deeds in the
chain of title to the property. The trial court found that Gens was
equitably estopped from claiming title to the property, and granted
summary judgment to White.88 However, the trial court was reversed by
the Georgia Supreme Court in 2016, which held that Gens was not
equitably estopped, and the matter was remanded to the trial court to
address the merits of the reformation counterclaim. 89 On cross motions
for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment to
Gens and against White. White appealed.90
The evidence showed that April Gens obtained a loan in 1999
encumbering 4.3 acres, including all of what was later carved out as Lot
7, and secured repayment by a security deed. April Gens later obtained
a second loan for the same property by then subdivided into lots
purported to be secured by a second security deed. However, the legal
description of the property contained in the second security deed only
described a 150-square foot access strip used for boat docking privileges
which was part of Lot 7. Thereafter, April Gens filed for bankruptcy,
identifying the properties described in the two security deeds as
properties to be surrendered to the bank. The bankruptcy stay was
lifted and the bank then foreclosed.91
After the foreclosure, the bank recorded a cancelation of only the first
security deed, which had encumbered all of Lot 7, and conveyed Lot 7 to
White’s predecessor in title by general warranty deed. However, the
legal description on the warranty deed used the erroneous description of
the second security deed conveying only the access strip. 92
In his motion for summary judgment, White introduced the
scrivener’s affidavit of the attorney who closed both loans with April
Gens. In it, the closing attorney contended that he prepared both
security deeds, and the second security deed was intended by the bank
and April Gens to convey all of Lot 7, and not just the access strip. 93 The

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

348 Ga. App. 145, 820 S.E.2d 254 (2018).
Id. at 145, 820 S.E.2d at 255.
Gens v. White, 299 Ga. 637, 791 S.E.2d 48 (2016).
White, 348 Ga. App. at 146, 820 S.E.2d at 255.
Id. at 146–47, 820 S.E.2d at 255–56.
Id. at 147, 820 S.E.2d at 256.
Id.
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court of appeals held that White had carried his burden to show mutual
mistake by the parties to the conveyance.94
Gens presented no evidence to rebut the closing attorney’s affidavit.
In fact, her deposition testimony supported the mutuality of the error as
she testified that April Gens believed she had lost all interest in Lot 7
due to the bankruptcy and foreclosure. The mutuality of the mistake
was further confirmed by the facts that White’s predecessor purchased
Lot 7 from the bank and built a house on it, that White then purchased
the property and he and his family lived on it for six and one half years,
and that April Gens took no action to stop the sale of the land,
construction of the house, or occupation by White.95
In finding in favor of Gens, the trial court focused on the lack of
evidence as to how or why the mistake was made in the second security
deed.96 The court of appeals reversed and held that when the
undisputed evidence shows the mutuality of the mistake, the cause of
the mistake is immaterial, particularly when the non-complaining party
is not prejudiced by reformation.97
Although Gens contended in the litigation that the mistake was not
mutual, she presented no evidence in support of her claim. Testimony
that April Gens had expressed a desire to retain Lot 7 for herself was
inconsistent with her subsequent decision to encumber Lot 7 in
exchange for loans from the bank and her later surrender of the
property in bankruptcy.98 The court of appeals stated that, had April
Gens not defaulted on her loans and surrendered the property in her
bankruptcy proceeding, she may have been able to retain Lot 7.99
However, given her voluntary surrender of Lot 7 in the bankruptcy
proceeding, the court of appeals could determine no prejudice in
reforming the deeds in the chain of title. 100 Accordingly, it was error to
grant summary judgment to Gens and to deny summary judgment to
White on his reformation claims. The matter was reversed and
remanded to the trial court with direction.101

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id.
Id. at 147–48, 820 S.E.2d at 256.
Id. at 148, 820 S.E.2d at 257.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 148–49, 820 S.E.2d at 255.
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IV. SALE OF REAL PROPERTY102
In Groce v. M24, LLC,103 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the
issue of whether a purchaser’s reliance on oral misrepresentations by
the seller’s agent regarding boundaries of real property which differed
from the description in the written contract constituted justifiable
reliance for a fraud claim.104 In October 2013, Valerie and Mark Groce
(the Groces) met with Steve Montgomery, an agent of M24, LLC (M24),
to look at a tract of undeveloped land being offered for sale by M24.
M24’s agent made representations to the Groces regarding the
boundary lines and stated that the tract included a creek. The Groces
agreed to the purchase and signed a contract with M24. The contract
between the parties included a legal description of the property being
purchased.105 The contract also included a merger clause stating that it
constituted the entire contract and there were no “other promises,
conditions, understandings or other agreements” between the parties. 106
In January 2014, the Groces began construction of a house on what
they thought was their property. In 2015, they discovered that the
house was built on property owned by another party. The Groces were
forced to move the structure.107
The Groces filed a lawsuit against M24 alleging fraud and that they
justifiably relied upon the representations of M24’s agent as to the
boundaries of the property. The trial court granted summary judgment
to M24 on the fraud claim, holding that the Groces could not
demonstrate that they justifiably relied upon M24 because they could
have discovered through their own due diligence that the land on which
the house was built was not part of the tract. On appeal, the Groces
argued that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to the element
of justifiable reliance in support of their fraud claim. 108
The court of appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling, holding that the
evidence “[was] plain and indisputable that the Groces failed as a
matter of law to exercise due diligence to discover the true boundaries
102. This section was authored by Alexander F. Koskey, III, CIPP/US. Associate,
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. Samford University (B.S., 2004);
Cumberland School of Law, Samford University (J.D., 2007). Member, State Bars of
Georgia, Florida, and Alabama; United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit,
United States District Courts for the Northern District of Georgia, Middle District of
Georgia, and Middle District of Florida.
103. 346 Ga. App. 157, 816 S.E.2d 703 (2018).
104. Id. at 157, 816 S.E.2d at 704.
105. Id. at 158, 816 S.E.2d at 704–05.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 158, 816 S.E.2d at 705.
108. Id. at 159, 816 S.E.2d at 705.
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of the property that was the subject of their transaction with M24,
because the contract for deed described those boundaries.” 109 The court
further determined that the Groces’ reliance in building the house “on a
description of the property that differed from the description in their
contract for deed was unjustifiable as a matter of law.” 110 The Groces
could not rely on oral representations about the boundaries of the tract
due to the merger clause in the contract. 111 Therefore, the Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed the granting of summary judgment to M24 on
the fraud claim.112
In Rivers v. Revington Glen Investments, LLC,113 the Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed a judgment in favor of a purchaser who brought a
breach of warranty claim against a seller, holding that the seller did not
breach warranty provisions in a sales contract which represented that
there were no environmental hazards on the property.114 In 2013,
William Rivers (Rivers), on behalf of the Rivers Family Trust (the
Trust), entered into a contract with Revington Glen Investments, LLC
(Revington) to sell 7.5 acres of land to Revington. Rivers claimed that
he had never walked the property before entering into the contract with
Revington. The contract contained representations and warranties from
Rivers and the Trust that they had never violated any environmental
regulations and that no hazardous substances existed on the
property.115
After Revington began developing the property, a large number of old
tires were discovered buried there, which is a violation of Georgia law.
Although Revington admitted that Rivers had no knowledge of and did
not place the tires on the property,116 it filed suit against Rivers alleging
breach of warranty, misrepresentation, intentional concealment, and
nuisance related to the contract. 117 The trial court found the Trust
liable under the contract since the existence of the buried tires and
other debris was in violation of law and constituted a breach of
warranty under the agreement between the parties. 118

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id. at 159–60, 816 S.E.2d at 706.
Id.
Id. at 160, 816 S.E.2d at 706.
346 Ga. App. 440, 816 S.E.2d 406 (2018).
Id. at 440, 816 S.E.2d at 407.
Id. at 441, 816 S.E.2d at 407–08.
Id.
Id. at 440, 816 S.E.2d at 407.
Id. at 442, 816 S.E.2d at 408.
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At trial and on appeal, Revington argued that the Trust made an
express warranty in the contract that the property “had not been used,
maintained or operated in any way which violated any . . . law” and the
existence of the tires constituted a violation of the law. 119 However, the
Georgia Court of Appeals held that the trial court’s reading of the
contract was incorrect.120 Specifically, the court of appeals held that the
express language of the agreement indicated only that the Trust was
warranting that it had not taken any action to violate the law, and “not
that it had taken steps to discover and remediate any existing hidden
issues caused by previous owners.”121 The court of appeals further held
that the contract provision did not include a warranty that all previous
owners had complied with the law and, if Revington wanted such a
warranty, one should have been in the contract. 122 Therefore, the
judgment in favor of Revington on the breach of warranty claim was
reversed.123
In BPP069, LLC v. Lindfield Holdings, LLC,124 the court of appeals
addressed the issue of whether a seller knowingly misrepresented a
property’s zoning status and concealed that the city intended to
demolish property and whether such representations supported a claim
for fraud.125 In July 2014, BBP069, LLC (BBP) entered into a contract
to purchase two parcels from Lindfield Holdings, LLC (Lindfield). The
contract entitled BBP to examine title to the parcels and provided a
seven-day due diligence period where the buyer could elect to terminate
the contract.126 Prior to the purchase, the two parcels had been zoned as
“Urban Rural–Historical Infill.”127 This zoning prohibited multifamily
housing, but the parcels had been granted a legal non-conforming use
status. Also, prior to the purchase by BBP, the city posted notice on the
parcels declaring the buildings unsafe and noticed the demolition of
each building. Although the notices of demolition were public record,
they did not include a legal description. 128 The sale of the parcels was
completed on July 30, 2014, at which time Lindfield Holdings executed
a seller’s affidavit swearing that there were “no encumbrances of record

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 442–43, 816 S.E.2d at 408.
Id. at 443, 816 S.E.2d at 408.
Id. at 443, 816 S.E.2d at 409.
346 Ga. App. 577, 816 S.E.2d 755 (2018).
Id. at 578, 816 S.E.2d at 756.
Id. at 579, 816 S.E.2d at 757.
Id. at 578, 816 S.E.2d at 757.
Id.
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affecting title to the parcels and that good merchantable title could be
conveyed free and clear of liens and encumbrances other than taxes for
the year 2014 and those not yet due and payable.” 129
In August 2014, Lindfield Holdings filed an application to change the
zoning classification of the two parcels even though it had sold the
parcels to BBP a week earlier. The city denied the application and
demolished the buildings on the parcels. BBP received an invoice from
the city for demolition costs in the amount of $17,179.90.130
BBP filed a suit against Lindfield Holdings and other third parties
alleging breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and
sought to rescind the contract.131 BBP specifically alleged that Lindfield
Holdings misrepresented the parcels as being zoned for multifamily
development and being in compliance with “local, state and federal
laws.”132 BBP also alleged that Lindfield Holdings failed to disclose the
demolition resolutions and the non-conforming use status of the parcels.
The trial court granted summary judgment to Lindfield Holdings on the
basis that BBP could not show justifiable reliance on the alleged
misrepresentations made by Lindfield Holdings. 133
BBP appealed contending that issues of fact existed with respect to
BBP’s ability to discover the demolition resolutions recorded in the
public record and further claimed that it exercised due diligence in
examining title to the two parcels—which did not disclose the
demolition resolutions since they were filed against the incorrect
owners.134 The court of appeals upheld summary judgment in favor of
Lindfield Holdings on the fraud claim as there was “no merit” in BBP’s
claim concerning the misrepresentations of the zoning of the property
since zoning is a legislative function of a county and it cannot serve as
the basis for a fraud action.135 The court of appeals further held that
“the record shows that the property’s zoning classification precluded
multifamily housing and that a process existed for a potential buyer to
verify whether a particular piece of property had been granted a legal
non-conforming use.”136 Therefore, the court of appeals upheld the

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 580, 816 S.E.2d at 758.
Id. at 580–81, 816 S.E.2d at 758.
Id. at 581, 816 S.E.2d at 758–59.
Id. at 581, 816 S.E.2d at 759.
Id.
Id. at 583, 816 S.E.2d at 760.
Id. at 585, 816 S.E.2d at 761.
Id. at 586, 816 S.E.2d at 761.
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award of summary judgment to Lindfield Holdings on the fraud
claim.137
V. EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, AND BOUNDARIES138
In Gilbert v. Canterbury Farms, LLC,139 the court of appeals held
that O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60140 does not limit the enforceability of restrictive
covenants to a twenty-year term or preclude the renewal of restrictive
covenants unless the restrictive covenant is subject to county or city
zoning laws.141
Here, the plaintiff property owners brought an action against the
defendants who intended to develop a lot. The plaintiffs claimed that
the lot in question could not be cleared and used for development
because such action would violate certain restrictive covenants that
were bound to the property.142 The defendants countered that the
restrictive covenant violated O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60, because the statute
prohibits automatic renewals of restrictive covenants on lots that have
fewer than fifteen subdivisions.143
Following a bench trial, the court determined that O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60
does not bar the renewal of restrictive covenants. 144 However, the court
refused to grant injunctive relief to prevent the defendants from further
developing the plot, holding that an injunction would cause undue
hardship to the defendants. 145
The court of appeals reversed in part, holding that O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60
does not preclude the restrictive covenant from renewing according to
the contractual terms.146 On the other hand, the court of appeals held
that plaintiffs were entitled to injunctive relief because the evidence did
not show how the defendants would be unduly burdened if they had to
halt constructing their development.147
137. Id. at 586, 816 S.E.2d at 762.
138. This section was authored by Tanisha Pinkins, Associate, Baker, Donelson,
Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. Buffalo State College, (B.A., 2010; B.S., 2010).
Emory University School of Law (J.D., 2016). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
139. 346 Ga. App. 804, 815 S.E.2d 303 (2018).
140. O.C.G.A. § 44-5-60 (2019).
141. Gilbert, 346 Ga. App. at 809, 815 S.E.2d at 308 (citing Sweeney v. Landings Ass’n,
Inc., 277 Ga. 761, 761–62, 595 S.E.2d 74, 75 (2004)).
142. Id. at 804, 815 S.E.2d at 305.
143. Id. at 808–09, 815 S.E.2d at 308.
144. Id. at 807, 815 S.E.2d at 307.
145. Id. at 814, 815 S.E.2d at 311.
146. Id. at 809–10, 815 S.E.2d at 308.
147. Id. at 813–14, 815 S.E.2d at 310–11 (noting that the defendants stipulated to the
fact that they violated the restricted covenant prior to receiving approval or a court order
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In Jeschke v. Turnstone Group, LLC, 148 the appeals court reviewed
whether declarations of covenants are effective after foreclosure of a
subdivision. In the matter, the Jeschkes (Plaintiffs) purchased a lot in a
subdivision. The lot was subject to a declaration of covenants. Shortly
after the Plaintiffs’ purchase, the unsold lots in the subdivision were
foreclosed. After foreclosure, the foreclosing bank sold the lots to REO
Funding. Four years later, Plaintiffs purchased a second lot from REO
Funding. In 2017 Plaintiffs were notified by Turnstone Group, LLC (a
representative of REO Funding) that because the homeowners
association created by the original developer had gone dormant, a new
homeowners association had been created. In response, Plaintiffs
brought suit against Turnstone Group seeking injunctive relief and a
declaration as to whether the Plaintiffs’ two lots were subject to the
developer’s declaration of covenants in light of the prior foreclosure.
Turnstone filed for partial summary judgment on the applicability of
the covenants to Plaintiffs’ two lots. The trial court granted the motion
and Plaintiffs appealed.149
Plaintiffs’ theory was that the foreclosure of the subdivision
extinguished the declaration of covenants. 150 The court of appeals held,
however, that the first lot obtained by Plaintiffs prior to the foreclosure
remained bound by the declaration of covenants as a matter of law
because Plaintiffs bought the first lot subject to the covenants and the
foreclosure specifically set out that only the unsold lots were being
foreclosed.151 The Plaintiffs’ first lot was unaffected by the foreclosure
and remained bound under the declaration of covenant under which
they had purchased.152
In support of their argument that the covenants did not apply to lots
purchased after foreclosure, Plaintiffs relied upon an implied covenant
theory.153 The appellate court applied that theory in reversing the trial
court, determining that whether the declaration of covenants was
bound to the lots purchased after foreclosure presented a question of
material fact of whether the declaration of covenant was void on any
property purchased after foreclosure.154

and that the defendants intended to continue to violate the covenant despite the present
court proceedings).
148. 348 Ga. App. 155, 820 S.E.2d 245 (2018).
149. Id. at 156–57, 820 S.E.2d at 246–47.
150. Id. at 157, 820 S.E.2d at 247.
151. Id. at 157–58, 820 S.E.2d at 247.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 158, 820 S.E.2d at 248.
154. Id.
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[W]here an owner of land subdivides it into lots for the purpose of
sale, under a general plan or scheme restricting the lots to certain
uses, restrictions that are embodied in such general plan or scheme
may in a proper case be imposed upon the lots beyond the express
restrictions contained in the deeds to the purchasers, on the theory of
implied covenants. The need for such a rule is particularly compelling
where third parties have relied on the applicability of the covenants.
The party wishing to enforce a non-express agreement must, of
course, establish the area covered by the agreement and the specific
content of the restrictions alleged. This is usually accomplished by
showing a common grantor’s general scheme or plan for developing
the property in question.155

Here, Plaintiffs were successful in pointing to evidence creating
material questions of fact as to whether the declaration of covenants
was applicable to the lot that they acquired after the foreclosure.
Specifically, plaintiffs pointed to the fact that the security deed was
filed before the foreclosure and was thus superior to the declaration of
covenants. Moreover, Plaintiffs showed that the declaration of
covenants had not been implemented, the homeowners association was
improperly formed, no dues or assessments were ever collected, and
that the declaration of covenants had never been enforced. So even
though Plaintiffs were clearly aware of the declaration of covenants,
having previously bought a lot subject to the declaration, questions of
fact remained as to whether they had knowledge that those restrictive
covenants were still in effect and applicable to the additional lot they
later purchased.156
In Emson Investment Properties, LLC v. JHJ Jodeco 65, LLC,157 the
appeals court analyzed and set out the requirements of quasieasements and implied easements. In Emson, a developer purchased
land through multiple limited liability corporations set up that way in
order to receive financing. Multiple loans were secured by the developer
through the separate corporate entities, each of which ultimately went
into default resulting in foreclosure of the loans. Emson and JHJ each
purchased property in the development at or after the foreclosures.158
A dispute arose about parking at the development, and Emson
installed a gate to halt access to the rear of his property and the
parking area. JHJ brought suit for declaratory judgment and injunctive

155. Id. (citing Castle Point Homeowners Ass’n, Inc. v. Simmons, 333 Ga. App. 501,
505–06, 773 S.E.2d 806, 809 (2015)).
156. Id. at 158–59, 820 S.E.2d at 248.
157. 349 Ga. App. 644, 824 S.E.2d 113 (2019).
158. Id. at 645–46, 824 S.E.2d at 115–16.
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relief, asserting rights to quasi-easements and implied easements
across Emson’s property. Following a bench trial, the trial court found
that JJH had both quasi-easements and implied easement rights across
Emson’s property and issued declarations and a permanent injunction
in favor of JHJ.159
On appeal, the appellate court reversed, determining that JHJ was
not entitled to quasi-easement rights for waters, sewer, and storm
water services beneath Emson’s property.160
A quasi-easement arises when the owner of an entire tract uses one
part of the tract for the benefit of another and thereafter the tract is
divided so that the benefitted parcel, quasi-dominant estate, is
separated from the burdened parcel, quasi-servient estate, If the
quasi-dominant estate receives a benefit that is apparent,
continuous, permanent in nature and is necessary and beneficial to
the enjoyment of the quasi-dominant estate, then an easement is
implied from the prior use.161

That is, a quasi-easement “‘requires proof that before the conveyance
or transfer severing the unity of title, the common owner used part of
the united parcel for the benefit of another part, and this use was
apparent and obvious, continuous, and permanent.’” 162 To be entitled to
a quasi-easement, JHJ must have proven that the development had a
single common owner. The court determined that it could not construe
unity of title from the chain of conveyance and concluded that there was
no common owner of the entire development at the outset. 163 Therefore,
JHJ had no right to a quasi-easement, and the trial court was
reversed.164
The appellate court next considered whether JHJ was entitled to an
implied easement. In Georgia, “for an implied easement to exist, (1) the
dominant estate must be landlocked, (2) the easement must be
necessary, and (3) the servient and dominant estates must have
previously comprised a single parcel under the same owner.” 165 In
addition to the finding that the two properties did not arise from a
single owner, the facts were undisputed that JHJ’s property was not

159. Id. at 646, 824 S.E.2d at 116.
160. Id. at 647, 824 S.E.2d at 116–17.
161. Id. at 647, 824 S.E.2d at 117.
162. Id. (quoting De Castro v. Durrell, 295 Ga. App. 194, 198, 671 S.E.2d 244, 249
(2008)).
163. Id. at 648, 824 S.E.2d at 117.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 648, 824 S.E.2d at 118.
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landlocked. Therefore, the trial court was reversed on the second
issue.166
VI. TRESPASS AND NUISANCE167
In Plantation at Bay Creek Homeowners Association, Inc. v.
Glasier,168 a Homeowners Association (HOA) brought suit against
homeowners in the community who disputed an easement across their
property providing access to a lake.169 The case arose after the Glasiers
purchased the property from Karen Kilbourne who purchased the
property from the original developer.170 During the time she owned the
property, Kilbourne disputed the existence of a pedestrian easement
across her property which provided access to the lake. She denied
others access to her property and was known to call the police to halt
pedestrian traffic. In 2007, the HOA determined that there was no lake
access and erected a sign which said: “NO LAKE ACCESS/NO
PARKING.”171
In 2012, the Glasiers purchased the property from Kilbourne. The
warranty deed contained standard language that the conveyance was
subject to all easements and restrictions of record but did not reference
the purported easement. At the time of purchase, the “NO LAKE
ACCESS/NO PARKING” sign was in place on the property. In 2014, the
HOA president, Charles Lorentz, entered the Glasiers’ yard without
their permission and removed the sign. Thereafter, people began using
the Glasiers’ property to gain access to the lake. The Glasiers objected
to the removal of the sign to an HOA member and learned that the
HOA planned to install a concrete pad on the path. The Glasiers then
installed their own no trespassing sign, but the HOA required removal
of the sign.172
The Glasiers contacted the original surveyor who reviewed his
records and advised that there was nothing in his records to show an
easement. He further advised that the label “10’ PEDESTRIAN ESMT”
appearing on the subdivision plat was an error. This information was
presented to the county department of planning which revised the plat
and removed the label. The HOA filed suit for equitable reformation of
the revised plat and sought injunctive relief to halt the Glasiers from
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.

Id. at 648–49, 824 S.E.2d at 118.
This section was authored by Linda S. Finley.
349 Ga. App. 203, 825 S.E.2d 542 (2019).
Id. at 203, 825 S.E.2d at 542.
Id. at 205, 825 S.E.2d at 546.
Id. at 205–06, 825 S.E.2d at 547 (capitalization in original).
Id. at 206, 825 S.E.2d at 547.
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interfering with the pedestrian walkway. The Glasiers filed an
eight-count counterclaim alleging quiet title, breach of quiet enjoyment,
trespass, theft by taking, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and seeking a declaratory judgment as to the revised plat,
injunctive relief prohibiting any person from crossing the Glasier
property without permission, and attorney’s fees and costs. 173
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment and the
matter was referred to a special master. The special master issued a
report concluding that there was no easement across the Glasiers’
property. The court adopted the special master’s report, denied the
HOA’s summary judgment, granted summary judgment to the Glasiers
on their counterclaims for quiet title, declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief, and denied the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment as to the remaining counterclaims. 174
On appeal, the HOA contended that the phrase on the plat, “10’
PEDESTRIAN ESMT,” was sufficient to the extent that the
homeowners were not entitled to a declaratory judgment or injunctive
relief.175 However, the court of appeals held the special master’s
findings that the phrase was “void for uncertainty of description,” was
proper.176 The court noted that because there were no lines, arrows, or
other markings connecting the phrase to the plat and the notation of
“10’” was unclear as to whether it referenced the length or width of the
purported easement that there was no means to quantify or determine
the easement location.177 Further, the plat did not provide a key for
determining an easement location. Therefore, the trial court’s order
granting summary judgment to the Glasiers was proper.178
The court next reviewed the Glasiers’ claim for trespass. 179 The claim
was brought on the grounds that the HOA president entered their
property on behalf of the HOA and removed the “NO LAKE ACCESS”
sign causing damages from the traffic which thereafter entered their
property.180
An owner of real property has the right to possess, use, enjoy, and
dispose of it, and the corresponding right to exclude others from its
use. In an action for trespass, the landowner may recover
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id.
Id. at 206–07, 825 S.E.2d at 547.
Id. at 207, 825 S.E.2d at 547.
Id. at 207, 825 S.E.2d at 548.
Id. at 207–08, 825 S.E.2d at 548.
Id. at 208, 825 S.E.2d at 548.
Id.
Id. at 208–09, 825 S.E.2d at 548.

[13] REAL PROPERTY-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

262

MERCER LAW REVIEW

11/26/2019 11:16 AM

[Vol. 71

compensatory damages upon a showing of any wrongful, continuing
interference with a right to the exclusive use and benefit of a
property right.181

The evidence was undisputed that the HOA president entered the
Glasiers’ property without permission and removed their sign and the
HOA president testified at deposition that he removed it in his capacity
as HOA president. A jury question was created as to whether the HOA
was liable for its president’s actions but not whether the trespass
occurred.182
Likewise, the court determined that the HOA was not entitled to
summary judgment on the theft by taking claim brought by the
Glasiers.183 Georgia statute provides a civil action for theft by taking
and allows the owner of the property to recover damages. 184 Because
there was a question of fact remaining as to whether the HOA
authorized its president to remove the sign erected on the property, a
jury question remained and a denial of summary judgment was
proper.185
Next, the court reviewed the denial of the HOA’s claim for summary
judgment on the Glasiers’ claim for breach of quiet enjoyment. Again,
the court ruled no error.186 The Glasiers alleged that their right of quiet
enjoyment of their property had been spoiled by the actions of people
wrongfully using the pedestrian easement to access the lake after being
told they could do so by the HOA and the removal of the sign from the
Glasier property.187 The evidence was sufficient to create a question of
fact and support the denial of summary judgment on the claim. 188
Moving to the Glasiers’ claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress, the court held that the trial court erred by denying the HOA’s
summary judgment motion.189 The court of appeals held that the
wrongful behavior alleged by the Glasiers was not so extreme as to
support the claim.190

181. Id. at 209, 825 S.E.2d at 549 (citing LN West Paces Ferry Ass’ns, LLC v.
McDonald, 306 Ga. App. 641, 703 S.E.2d 85 (2010)).
182. Id. at 209–10, 825 S.E.2d at 549.
183. Id. at 210, 825 S.E.2d at 549.
184. Id. at 210, 825 S.E.2d at 549–50 (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-10-6 (2019)).
185. Id. at 210, 825 S.E.2d at 550.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 210–11, 825 S.E.2d at 550.
188. Id. at 211, 825 S.E.2d at 550.
189. Id. at 212–13, 825 S.E.2d at 551.
190. Id. at 212, 825 S.E.2d at 551.
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“Four elements must be present to support a claim of intentional
infliction of emotional distress: (1) The conduct must be intentional
or reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3)
there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and
the emotional distress; and (4) the emotional distress must be
severe.”191

Whether the claim rises to a level of outrageousness to sustain such a
claim is a question of law.192 The HOA also sought summary judgment
on the Glasiers’ claim for attorney’s fees and costs of litigation. Again,
the HOA’s arguments came up short and the appeals court found that
the trial court did not err when it denied the HOA’s motion for
summary judgment on this claim. 193 “O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 provides for an
award of attorney’s fees against a defendant who has (1) acted in bad
faith, (2) been stubbornly litigious, or (3) caused plaintiff unnecessary
trouble and expense.”194 Whether a party is entitled to such fees is a
jury question. The Glasiers’ claim for trespass would in itself support a
claim for expenses of litigation and attorney’s fees. 195 “The legal theory
is that the intentional nature of the trespass gives rise to the bad faith
necessary for such recovery.”196 Therefore, because summary judgment
was properly denied to the HOA on the Glasiers’ claim for trespass, the
denial of the HOA’s motion for summary judgment by the trial court
was proper.197
Finally, the court of appeals determined that the trial court’s denial
of summary judgment to the HOA on the Glasiers’ punitive damages
claim was proper.198 Punitive damages can be awarded when there is
evidence of “willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression,
or that entire want of care which would raise the presumption of
conscious indifference to consequences.”199 Here, whether the trespass
of the HOA was knowing and willful or that it demonstrated conscious
disregard to the rights of the Glasiers created a question of fact for jury
determination.200
191. Id. (quoting Sevcech v. Ingles Markets, Inc., 222 Ga. App. 221, 474 S.E.2d 4
(1996)).
192. Id. at 212, 825 S.E.2d at 550.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 213, 825 S.E.2d at 551.
195. Id. at 213, 825 S.E.2d at 552.
196. Id. (citing Mize v. McGarity, 293 Ga. App. 714, 667 S.E.2d 695 (2008)).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 213–14, 825 S.E.2d at 552 (citing Camp Cherokee, Inc. v. Marina Lane,
LLC, 316 Ga. App. 366, 729 S.E.2d 510 (2012)).
200. Id. at 214, 825 S.E.2d at 552.
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A reminder that the actions of a third party can be held against
another is found in Whitaker Farms, LLC v. Fitzgerald Fruit Farms,
LLC.201 The facts were that Sean Lennon (Lennon) owned Fitzgerald
Farms and farmed peaches. Carroll Farms was owned by Kay Barnes
(Kay) and her son Hynes Barnes (Hynes). Lennon worked at Carroll
Farms during high school and college and after receiving his master’s
degree in 2003, he began full-time peach farming. Around 2006, Kay
and Hynes agreed to allow Lennon to grow peaches on a twenty-acre
tract on their farm. The parties began with an oral handshake deal for
Lennon to lease the tract for the life of the peach trees but later a lease
was executed so that Lennon could obtain crop insurance. Lennon also
maintained a cooled, commercial packing shed nearby which was used
to store the peaches out of the Georgia sun. 202
In October 2015, Kay and Hynes sold their farm to Curtis Whitaker,
the owner of Whitaker Farms, including the twenty-acre orchard where
Lennon farmed his peaches.203 At the closing of the sale, Carroll and
Hynes both executed an owner’s affidavit representing that the
property sold was “subject to no leases, tenancies, adverse possession,
occupancy rights, licenses, or similar claims by third parties.” 204 Hynes
did not advise Whitaker that Lennon was farming a twenty-acre peach
orchard or that he had farmed that land for over a decade. After the
purchase, Hynes stayed on to manage the property for Whitaker
Farms.205
Several months after the sale, Lennon prepared for harvest and came
onto the land as needed during a seven-month period. Lennon testified
that he never saw Whitaker in the orchard but saw Hynes drive by
many times each day. At no time did Hynes inform Lennon that the
property had sold. In August 2016, harvest of the peaches began. The
first truck load was picked and dropped off at the Fitzgerald Farms’
packing facility without incident. The workers returned for a second
load, again without problem, but when they started to leave, all the
gates were locked. Hynes was observed driving away from one of the
locked gates. The workers called Lennon to tell him they were locked in.
Lennon called Hynes asking him to unlock the gates, prompting a text
message from Hynes that Lennon should talk to the new owner. Up
until that time, Lennon did not know that Carroll Farms had been sold.
Lennon called the sheriff’s office attempting to get the locks cut, and in
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

347 Ga. App. 381, 819 S.E.2d 666 (2018).
Id. at 381–82, 819 S.E.2d at 668–69.
Id. at 382, 819 S.E.2d at 669.
Id.
Id.
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the meantime, Hynes called Whitaker. Whitaker testified that the
phone conversation was only incidental to the locked gates. Whitaker
did not contact Lennon despite Lennon’s repeated calls. 206
Lennon obtained a court order and the sheriff cut the locks. The next
morning Hynes relocked the gates. Lennon filed a complaint against
Hynes for temporary restraining order (TRO) and other relief, advising
the court that the matter needed immediate attention so that the crop
would not be lost, and asking the court to order that he be allowed to
enter the property to complete the peach harvest. In response, Whitaker
applied for a criminal arrest warrant against Lennon. The superior
court granted the TRO, and Hynes unlocked the gates. Unfortunately,
by that time the peaches were ruined.207
Fitzgerald Farms’ complaint included a claim for trespass which “was
later amended to include claims for unjust enrichment and attorney’s
fees.”208 Whitaker Farms intervened in the action and filed a
counterclaim. Hynes was dismissed from the action with consent of the
parties and Fitzgerald Farms withdrew its claim for unjust enrichment.
The trial court ruled that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive
damages because Whitaker did not lock the workers in the field himself,
and even if he ratified Hynes’s conduct, the court would not allow the
jury to extrapolate from the facts a claim for punitive damages. The
jury was more sympathetic and found in favor of Fitzgerald Farms in
the amount of $150,000 and awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of
$400,000. The trial court denied Whitaker Farms’ motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict but reduced the attorney’s fees to
$272,000.209
The trespass claim hinged on whether Whitaker ratified the conduct
of Hynes who locked the gates. 210 “In general, an employer is not
responsible for the torts of its independent contractor.”211 However, an
exception exists if the employer ratifies the conduct of the independent
contractor.212 “Ratification can be either express, or implied from: (1)
slight acts of confirmation by the employer; (2) silence or acquiescence
of the employer; or (3) where the employer receives and holds the
benefits of an unauthorized wrong.”213 The court of appeals held that

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 382–84, 819 S.E.2d at 669–70.
Id. at 384, 819 S.E.2d at 670.
Id.
Id. at 384–85, 819 S.E.2d at 670–71.
Id. at 385, 819 S.E.2d at 671.
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-2-4 (2019)).
Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5 (2019)).
Id. at 386, 819 S.E.2d at 671.
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Whitaker had, indeed, ratified the conduct of Hynes because Whitaker
knew that Lennon had worked on and harvested the peaches at the
former Carroll Farm for at least a decade and that Hynes locked the
gates of the peach orchard during harvest resulting in destruction of the
crop.214 Further, Whitaker ratified the actions of Hynes when he failed
to instruct Hynes to allow Lennon’s workers into the orchard, when he
did not stop the re-locking of the gates, when he ignored Lennon’s
phone calls, and when he attempted to have Lennon arrested.215 As to
Whitaker Farms’ contention that there was no evidence to support
attorney’s fees, the court disagreed and held the fees reasonable and
supported by the evidence.216
On the cross-appeal by Fitzgerald Farms, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court, holding that it was error to withdraw the
punitive damages claim from consideration by the jury.217 The actions
taken by Whitaker Farms provided sufficient evidence of “conscious
indifference” to allow the claim to go to the jury.218 Specifically,
“Whitaker allowed the gates to Fitzgerald Farms’ orchard to remain
locked while Fitzgerald Farms’ peach harvest rotted, and he not only
refused to unlock the gates despite Lennon’s pleas to finish harvesting
the peaches, but sought to have Lennon arrested.” 219
VII. FORECLOSURE OF REAL PROPERTY220
The Georgia courts took a scattershot approach with their foreclosure
jurisprudence this year, clarifying some important principles.
First, the Georgia Court of Appeals waded into the issues that can
arise when materialman’s liens and a mortgage loan come into contact.
In Fannie Mae v. Las Colinas Apartments, LLC,221 the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) foreclosed a security deed for a
multi-family property that was also the subject of a number of
materialman’s liens. The multifamily loan was non-recourse, meaning
214. Id.
215. Id. at 386, 819 S.E.2d at 671–72.
216. Id. at 386, 819 S.E.2d at 672.
217. Id. at 389, 819 S.E.2d at 673.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 389, 819 S.E.2d at 673–74.
220. This section was authored by Dylan W. Howard, Shareholder, Baker, Donelson,
Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC. Yale University (B.A., cum laude, 1999); University
of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2002). Member, State Bar of Georgia, Supreme
Court of Georgia, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, United States
District Courts for the Northern District of Georgia, Middle District of Georgia, and
Southern Districts of Georgia.
221. 346 Ga. App. 867, 815 S.E.2d 334 (2018).
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that Fannie Mae’s remedies would ordinarily be limited to recovering
the property.222 The note at issue contained language that the borrower
and guarantor could be personally liable if the security deed was
transferred.223 Following foreclosure, Fannie Mae confirmed the sale 224
and filed a deficiency action against the borrower and a guarantor.
Fannie Mae argued that the recorded materialman’s liens constituted
transfers sufficient to trigger personal liability under the note. The trial
court denied Fannie Mae’s argument in this regard, holding that the
note was ambiguous that Fannie Mae suffered no injury as a result of
the materialman’s liens.225 On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals
overturned the trial court’s decision.226 It held that the loan documents
were unambiguous and that the lack of damages to Fannie Mae was
irrelevant, as competent parties are free to insert any provision they
wish into a contract unless void by public policy. 227 As a result, the court
reversed the grant of summary judgment to the defendants and
remanded the case to the trial court with an instruction to enter
summary judgment in favor of Fannie Mae. 228
In Oconee Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Brown,229 the
Georgia Court of Appeals returned to the oft-contentious issue of
whether a borrower seeking to prevent a foreclosure must tender the
amount owed under the loan.230 The borrowers obtained a home equity
line of credit and failed to repay it. In response, the lender sent a letter
accelerating the balance of the loan and notifying borrowers that it
would not accept any payment less than the total amount owed. When
borrowers failed to reinstate, the lender scheduled a non-judicial
foreclosure sale. Borrowers then sued, and filed a motion seeking an
order directing any funds they were to pay be deposited in the registry
of the trial court. The lender opposed the motion, arguing that pursuant
to the note the borrowers were required to pay funds to the lender, not
to the court’s registry. During the course of the lawsuit, the debt
matured. The trial court ultimately granted the motion, enjoining
foreclosure so long as the borrowers made a specified monthly payment

222. Id. at 868, 815 S.E.2d at 336.
223. Id. at 870, 815 S.E.2d at 337.
224. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (2019) which sets out the statutory requirements for
confirming a foreclosure sale.
225. Fannie Mae, 346 Ga. App. at 871, 815 S.E.2d at 337–38.
226. Id. at 871, 815 S.E.2d at 338.
227. Id. at 871–73, 815 S.E.2d at 338–39.
228. Id. at 873–74, 815 S.E.2d at 339.
229. 349 Ga. App. 54, 825 S.E.2d 456 (2019).
230. Id. at 54, 825 S.E.2d at 458.
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into the court’s registry. The lender appealed and the Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court’s injunction order. 231
First, the court held that tendering the funds to the registry of the
trial court was insufficient; the funds had to be tendered to the
lender.232 Second, the court held that the case did not present
sufficiently compelling circumstances justifying a departure from the
tender rule, i.e., where a lender tortiously interfered with a borrower’s
ability to pay.233 Finally, the court refuted the borrower’s claim that
they should not be required to tender because the lender had previously
refused to accept any payment less than the full amount owed. 234
Noting that the lender’s refusal occurred before the loan matured, that
the lender had subsequently demanded payments, and that the
borrowers failed to make any actual attempt to tender following the
loan’s maturity, the court denied this claim. 235
In Derby Properties, LLC v. Watson,236 the Georgia Court of Appeals
clarified the means by which Georgia counties can utilize foreclosure to
enforce nuisance abatement liens.237 The defendant in the matter
recorded a nuisance abatement lien against real property and then
utilized the non-judicial tax foreclosure sale procedure to sell the
property to plaintiff. The plaintiff subsequently demanded that the
county return the purchase price, claiming that the county had
inappropriately utilized the non-judicial tax foreclosure procedures
pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-4-1238 rather than the judicial in rem tax
foreclosure procedures pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-4-76.239 After the
county refused the plaintiff’s request, he filed a lawsuit challenging the
legality of the sale. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the
county, and plaintiff appealed.240 The court of appeals affirmed the trial
court’s ruling, holding that the nuisance abatement statute enabled a
county tax commissioner to collect the amount of the lien using any
available method.241 Finally, the court of appeals concluded that the
Georgia Legislature’s intent in crafting the in rem tax foreclosure

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id. at 54–59, 825 S.E.2d at 458–61.
Id. at 64, 825 S.E.2d at 464.
Id.
Id. at 62, 825 S.E.2d at 462–63.
Id. at 62–63, 825 S.E.2d at 463.
346 Ga. App. 631, 816 S.E.2d 766 (2018).
Id. at 632, 816 S.E.2d at 767.
O.C.G.A § 48-4-1 (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 48-4-76 (2019).
Derby, 346 Ga. App. at 632, 816 S.E.2d at 767.
Id. at 633–34, 816 S.E.2d at 768.
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statute was to provide an alternative to the non-judicial tax foreclosure
procedures, rather than to replace them entirely.242 As a result, the
Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision upholding
the sale.243
VIII.CONDEMNATION AND EMINENT DOMAIN244
In Bryde v. City of Atlanta,245 the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered whether the award of compensation in a condemnation
action was solely governed by the condemnation statute or if civil
practice act rules apply.246 On March 6, 2018, the City of Atlanta (City)
brought condemnation proceedings against property owned by Virginia
and Walton Bryde to complete a bridge on Powers Ferry Road. The
petition and declaration of taking were personally served on March 27,
2018 according to the requirements of O.C.G.A. § 32-3-8.247 The Brydes
filed an answer with a notice of appeal on May 4, 2018, under O.C.G.A.
§ 32-3-14248 seeking a jury trial on the issue of compensation. The City
moved to dismiss the notice of appeal as untimely under O.C.G.A.
§ 32-3-14, and the trial court entered final judgment for the Brydes at
the original compensation amount. The Brydes appealed and argued
that their notice of appeal was timely under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(h) of the
Civil Procedure Act,249 and that even if the notice of appeal was
untimely, the trial court erred in dismissing their answer.250
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(h) requires the person serving the process to
provide proof of “service with the court in the county in which the action
is pending within five business days of the service date.” 251 If the proof
of service is not filed within five business days, the time for the party
served to answer the process will not run until such proof of service is
filed. The return of service affidavits showed that Walton Bryde was
personally served at his residence and Virginia Bryde’s service was
242. Id.
243. Id. at 635, 816 S.E.2d at 769.
244. This section was authored by Ivy N. Cadle, Shareholder, Baker, Donelson,
Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C.; Adjunct Professor of Law, Mercer University
School of Law. University of Georgia (B.S., 2000; M.Acc., 2002; CPA, 2008); Mercer
University School of Law (J.D., 2007). Member, State and Federal Bars of Georgia; United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit; Supreme Court of the United States.
245. 350 Ga. App. 129, 828 S.E.2d 122 (2019).
246. Id.
247. O.C.G.A. § 32-3-8 (2019).
248. O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14 (2019).
249. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-4(h) (2019).
250. Bryde, 350 Ga. App. at 129–30, 828 S.E.2d at 123–24.
251. Id. at 129, 828 S.E.2d at 123–24.

[13] REAL PROPERTY-BP (DO NOT DELETE)

270

MERCER LAW REVIEW

11/26/2019 11:16 AM

[Vol. 71

effected by leaving copies with Walton Bryde on March 27, 2018. Both
affidavits were filed with the court clerk on April 5, 2018, which was
more than five business days from the date of service. The Brydes filed
their notice of appeal and answer on May 4, 2018, which was within
thirty days of the date the City’s return of service affidavits were
filed.252 The City argued that the Brydes’ notice of appeal was untimely
under O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14, which requires the declaration to be filed no
“later than 30 days following the date of service as provided for in Code
Sections 32-3-8 and 32-3-9.”253 The City argued that the Brydes had
thirty days from March 27, 2018 to file their notice of appeal, and thus,
the May 4, 2018 notice of appeal was filed after the expiration of the
thirty-day deadline. The City also contended that Rule 4(h)’s permission
to file the notice of appeal more than thirty days following personal
service conflicts with O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14.254
The court held that the Civil Procedure Act’s grant of time extensions
are permitted under specific circumstances which do not include periods
of time fixed by other statutes. 255 The court found that O.C.G.A.
§ 32-3-14 clearly states that an owner can file a notice of appeal “not
later than 30 days following the date of service.”256 Consequently,
Rule 4(h) conflicts with the statutory provision in O.C.G.A. § 32-3-14,
and therefore, the Brydes’ notice of appeal was untimely. 257
In Hayman v. Paulding County,258 the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered whether Paulding County (County) created a continuing
nuisance, trespass, and inverse condemnation by failing to maintain
and repair its storm sewer drainage systems. 259 In 1987, Elana Mor
built a home in Paulding County where a creek west of the property
flowed into culverts that ran under a road south of the property. A
small drainage ditch ran along the road and emptied water into the
creek. Around 2005 or 2006, the County cleared debris from the culverts
and there was no evidence that the County cleaned out the culverts
again. In 2003, Bill and Wendy Hayman moved into the Mor home, and
within six months, they had water intrusion in the bedroom and
kitchen. During heavy rains, water flowed over the drainage and onto
the property. The plaintiffs called the County over a dozen times and

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. at 129–30, 828 S.E.2d at 124.
Id. at 130, 828 S.E.2d at 124 (emphasis omitted).
Id.
Id. at 131, 828 S.E.2d at 125.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 131–32, 828 S.E.2d at 125.
349 Ga. App. 77, 825 S.E.2d 482 (2019).
Id. at 79, 825 S.E.2d at 484.
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complained about the storm sewer runoff and flooding, but nothing
changed. The Haymans attempted to clear the culverts and seal the
walls, but the flooding continued. In September 2009, heavy rains
caused substantial flooding (over two feet) into the plaintiffs’ home. Bill
Hayman performed excavation, installation of French drains, and
installation of forty to fifty truckloads of dirt to raise the yard ground
level, cleaned the ditch, and connected the driveway ditch to a gravel
ditch to reduce the flooding.260
On December 11, 2012, plaintiffs filed suit against the County for
creation of a continuing nuisance, trespass, and inverse condemnation
by failing to maintain and repair its storm drainage systems. On May 3,
2016, the trial court granted the County’s motion for summary
judgment.261 Plaintiffs appealed, and the court of appeals vacated and
remanded the case.262 On remand, the trial court again found that the
plaintiffs could not attribute the flooding to a specific cause other than
the rain.263
The court of appeals agreed that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment for inverse condemnation. 264 Counties in Georgia
are “not . . . generally liable for creating nuisances,” but “may be liable
for damages if it creates a condition on private property, such as a
nuisance, that amounts to inverse condemnation or a taking without
compensation.”265 The court described a nuisance as “anything that
causes hurt, inconvenience, or damage to another[,] and the fact that
the act done may otherwise be lawful shall not keep it from being a
nuisance.”266 However, the court cautioned that “a single isolated
occurrence is not an actionable nuisance.” 267
The appeals court held that the maintenance of the sewer line with
an obstruction was continuous because there was evidence that the
County “knew or should have known after the first overflow that the
obstruction was in its line.”268 Also, based on testimony of plaintiffs’
experts, the culverts should have been able to handle the storms if they
were maintained properly.269

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id. at 78–79, 825 S.E.2d at 483–84.
Id. at 79, 825 S.E.2d at 484.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 80, 825 S.E.2d at 485.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 81, 825 S.E.2d at 485.
Id. at 81–82, 825 S.E.2d at 486.
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IX. TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY270
The procedural requirements to properly bar the equity right of
redemption continue to be an issue for practitioners. In Dukes v.
Munoz,271 the court of appeals reviewed the requirements for service of
an action to cut off redemption.272 The facts on appeal showed that
Dukes owned real property in Fulton County, Georgia, and failed to pay
the ad valorem taxes resulting in foreclosure of the property by the
sheriff. Munoz, Martinez, and Higgins (Purchasers) were the high
bidders at the foreclosure sale in January 2014. In January 2015, 273
Purchasers began the process to foreclose the equity right of redemption
and sent Dukes notice of an impending barment of his property rights.
Notice was sent to Dukes via certified mail/return receipt using the
address of the property foreclosed, Purchasers having obtained that
information from the 2014 county tax bill. The letter was returned to
Purchasers as undeliverable.274
Purchasers filed a petition to quiet title to the property. Their
attorney engaged a private investigator to locate Dukes to effect service
of the suit.275 The investigator reported back that using “normal
investigative methods and procedures,” he was unable to locate
Dukes.276 Based on that information, Purchasers moved to serve Dukes
by publication. A special master appointed by the trial court found that
service by publication was justified and the court issued an order
allowing such service. At the subsequent evidentiary hearing, the
special master found that Purchasers had perfected service of Dukes by
publication and had therefore properly barred Dukes’s right of
redemption.277
Shortly after the special master’s findings were reported to the court,
Dukes filed an objection on the grounds that he had not been properly
served with barment notice or with the quiet title action. Pursuant to
the statute, Dukes tendered the redemption sum into the court’s
registry. In support of his motion, Dukes submitted evidence from a
private investigator he had retained who concluded that Dukes could

270. This section was authored by Linda S. Finley.
271. 346 Ga. App. 319, 816 S.E.2d 164 (2018).
272. Id. at 319, 816 S.E.2d at 165.
273. O.C.G.A. § 48-4-45 (2019) sets out that after expiration of twelve months from the
date of the tax foreclosure sale, a purchaser may proceed with an action to bar the right to
redeem.
274. Dukes, 346 Ga. App. at 320, 816 S.E.2d at 166.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Id.
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have been located in any number of ways through a Google internet
search. Those search results revealed biographical and employment
information about Dukes, multiple email addresses, postal addresses,
and telephone numbers. Further investigation also revealed multiple
social media accounts. The investigator also found a current mailing
address for Dukes using the website for the county tax assessor and in
subscription databases in the Georgia Secretary of State’s occupational
licensing division, in voter registration data, and in the property
records of Dougherty County where the Google search indicated Dukes
resided.278 Based on all the ways that Dukes could be located, the
investigator concluded that “a minimal effort to locate a means for
contacting Winfred Dukes would have been successful.” 279 Nevertheless,
the trial court adopted the special master’s report and denied Dukes’s
motion.280
The court of appeals reversed the trial court, reviewing statutes
which govern quiet title actions.281 First, the statute requires personal
service upon “known persons whose residence is ascertainable.” 282 The
trial court may order service by publication “where the respondent . . .
resides outside [the state of Georgia] or whose residence is unknown.” 283
Because service by publication is “notoriously unreliable,” service by
publication should be ordered only if the respondent’s address cannot be
determined after the plaintiff has exercised reasonable diligence to
locate that respondent.284 The court then reviewed the requirements to
prove “reasonable diligence” finding that plaintiffs must “pursu[e] every
reasonable available channel of information to locate the defendant.” 285
Based on the investigation performed by Dukes’s investigator, the court
of appeals concluded that the Purchasers “failed to pursue obvious and
fruitful channels of information that would have allowed them to
ascertain Dukes’ current address with minimal effort.”286 Therefore,
service of Dukes by publication was improper.287
When an owner or interest holder of property desires to exercise its
equity right of redemption, Georgia law provides that the interest
278. Id. at 320–21, 816 S.E.2d at 166.
279. Id. at 321, 816 S.E.2d at 166.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 323, 816 S.E.2d at 168.
282. Id. at 321, 816 S.E.2d at 167 (citing O.C.G.A. § 23-3-65(b) (2019)).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 322, 816 S.E.2d at 167 (citing Reynolds v. Reynolds, 296 Ga. 461, 769
S.E.2d 511 (2015)).
286. Id. at 323, 816 S.E.2d at 168.
287. Id.
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holder pay the purchaser of the property the purchase price, all taxes
paid on the property after the sale, any special assessments, and a
penalty of 20% of the purchase price the first year and 10% each year
thereafter.288 At times, the purchaser does not want to accept the
redemption sum or the property owner balks at the calculated
redemption sum. As Northlake Manor Condominium Association, Inc. v.
Harvest Assets, LLC,289 illustrates, disputes can arise based on this
calculation.
In December 2013, Harvest Assets purchased a condominium unit
located in the Northlake Manor Condominium, which was sold by the
sheriff of DeKalb County for unpaid taxes. The Northlake Manor
Condominium Association (Association) claimed a lien on the unit for
unpaid condominium assessments and sought to exercise its right to
redeem the property from the sale. The Association requested that
Harvest Assets provide the proper sum for redemption and also
demanded that Harvest Assets pay condominium assessments which
had accrued since the date of the tax sale.290 Harvest Assets paid the
Association $5,000 to “cover the association fees currently due” plus
“future dues as they come due.”291 Harvest Assets then added the
$5,000 assessment sum it had paid to the amount it demanded from the
Association to redeem the property, seeking $15,120. The Association
objected to the amount and tendered a sum which did not include the
$5,000 payment for delinquent assessments. Harvest Assets rejected
the lower payment and the Association filed suit to require it to accept
tender and deliver the Association a deed of redemption. Subsequently,
the Association filed an amended complaint that sought an award of all
unpaid assessments that had accrued during the litigation, plus late
fees, interest, and attorney’s fees. The Association also sought
injunctive relief to prevent Harvest Assets from foreclosing its equity
right to redeem the property. Cross-motions for summary judgment
were filed by the parties, and while these motions were pending, the
parties entered into a consent order whereby Harvest Assets agreed to
forbear from proceeding with a barment action until further order of the
court or the matter was otherwise resolved. The Association agreed that
during this period it would take no action to collect the assessments and
other sums it claimed due. The trial court ruled that the amount
tendered by the Association to redeem the property was proper and that
Harvest Assets could not include the sum it had paid the Association as
288.
289.
290.
291.

O.C.G.A. § 48-4-42 (2019).
345 Ga. App. 575, 812 S.E.2d 658 (2019).
Id. at 576–77, 812 S.E.2d at 660.
Id. at 577, 812 S.E.2d at 660.
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part of the redemption amount.292 Harvest Assets appealed and the
court of appeals reversed the trial court’s finding that the $5,000 paid
was a “special assessment.”293 The provisions of O.C.G.A. § 48-4-42
“include condominium association assessments paid by a tax sale
purchaser, and that a tax sale purchaser is entitled to repayment of
those assessments as part of the redemption price.” 294 The court of
appeals, however, concluded that the $5,000 added to the redemption
sum was inflated because it improperly included attorney’s fees and
interest which should not have been included in the redemption
demand.295 The matter was then remanded to the trial court.296
Subsequently, the Association decided it would not seek to redeem
the property from the tax sale and would only pursue its claims for the
unpaid assessments that had continued to accrue during the litigation.
It dismissed that portion of its complaint which sought to redeem the
property. Harvest Assets amended its answer to add a counterclaim for
declaratory relief seeking judgment that payment of the accrued
assessments was inequitable. The Association moved for summary
judgment on its claim seeking to collect the accrued assessments above
the $5,000 already paid. It also sought an award of interest, late
charges on the unpaid assessments, and its attorney’s fees. Harvest
Assets opposed the motion on the grounds that the terms of the earlier
consent order would not allow such collection. The trial court denied the
Association’s motion and granted Harvest Assets’ motion for a
declaratory judgment. Although the trial court’s order was based upon
the language of the consent order, because the Association no longer
sought to redeem the property, the court could set aside the Order so
that Harvest Assets could complete the barment process and the
Association could seek payment of the assessment from the date of the
entry of the Consent Order forward. The Association appealed on the
grounds that the trial court erred in denying the Association’s claim for
all the assessments that had accrued during the litigation. 297
In once again reversing the trial court, the court of appeals held that

292. Id. at 577–78, 812 S.E.2d at 660–61. In support of its position that it was entitled
to add the $5,000 assessment amount to the redemption demand, Harvest Assets relied
upon O.C.G.A. § 48-4-42 that the amount tendered to the condominium association was a
“special assessment.” Id. at 578, 812 S.E.2d at 661.
293. Id.
294. Id. (citing Harvest Assets, LLC v. Northlake Manor Condo. Ass’n, 340 Ga. App.
237, 796 S.E.2d 319 (2017)).
295. Id. at 578, 812 S.E.2d at 661.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 578–80, 812 S.E.2d at 661–62.
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[a] consent order is essentially a binding agreement of the parties
that is sanctioned by a court, and it is subject to the rules governing
the interpretation and enforcement of contracts. Accordingly, a
consent order can be construed according to the general rules of
contract construction. Furthermore, where the language of a contract
is plain and unambiguous, no construction is required or permissible
and the terms of the contract must be given an interpretation of
ordinary significance.298

The court held that the language of the consent order did not bar the
collection of the assessments.299 Instead the order provided that the
association would “take no action outside the confines of [the] case to
collect or otherwise enforce its claim to [the] assessments.” 300
Additionally, the appellate court held that Association was entitled to
payment of the assessments on the basis of equity. 301 The court of
appeals followed existing case law which held “that a tax deed
purchaser of property is obligated to pay homeowners association
assessments that accrue after the sale, even during the period before
the purchaser can foreclose on the right of redemption.”302 The
defeasible fee title that Harvest Assets received at the purchase of the
property triggered automatic membership in the condominium
association, and made it liable to the accruing assessments, even those
that accrued during the redemption period.303
In DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors v. Astor ATL, LLC,304 the
court of appeals addressed the issue of whether the purchase price at a
foreclosure sale pursuant to a deed under power qualifies as an arm’s
length bona fide sale for purposes of determining the assessed value of
taxable real property.305 In 2015 Astor ATL, LLC (Astor) purchased
three properties in DeKalb County at separate foreclosure sales. Astor
paid $92,000 for property on Hill Creek Cove, $86,000 for property on
Royal Springs Court, and $103,566 for property on Smithfield Trail. In
2016 the DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors assessed each of the
properties in excess of Astor’s purchase price. The Hill Creek Cove
property was assessed at $112,800, Royal Springs Court was assessed

298. Id. at 580–81, 812 S.E.2d at 662–63.
299. Id. at 581, 812 S.E.2d at 663.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 582, 812 S.E.2d at 663 (citing Canady v. Cumberland Harbour Prop.
Owners Ass’n, 340 Ga. App. 439, 797 S.E.2d 674 (2017)).
303. Id.
304. 349 Ga. App. 867, 826 S.E.2d 685 (2019).
305. Id. at 869, 826 S.E.2d at 687.
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at $109,900, and Smithfield Trail was assessed at $128,400. Astor
appealed the tax assessment to the DeKalb County Board of
Equalization which upheld each assessment. Astor appealed to the trial
court.306
In the trial court, Astor moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the foreclosures were arm’s length bona fide sales and
therefore the assessed value was limited to the 2015 purchase price
pursuant to statute O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2.307 The trial court granted Astor’s
motion for summary judgment limiting the assessed value of the
properties to the 2015 foreclosure sales prices. 308
DeKalb County appealed on the grounds that the purchase of the
three properties were not arm’s length transactions because the sellers
(the parties whose interests were being foreclosed) were not willing
participants to the sales and were not participating in the sales. 309
After first examining the statutes governing assessment, the court of
appeals held that the foreclosure sales were bona fide arm’s length
transactions.310 DeKalb County relied upon the language of O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-2, which provides that, for an assessment to be stayed, the
purchase must be in good faith and carried out by a willing buyer and a
willing seller each acting in his or her own self-interest, “including but
not limited to a distress sale, short sale, bank sale, or sale at a public
auction.”311 However, that provision cannot be read standing alone. The
court of appeals examined three statutory provisions: O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-1,312 which excludes forced sales from setting the valuation of a
property; O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3),313 which freezes the assessed value to
the price paid at a recent arm’s length bona fide sale; and O.C.G.A.
§ 48-5-2(.1),314 which defines the terms “arm’s length, bona fide sale.”
Then, the court considered the language of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2 which
provides “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the
contrary.”315 Examined together using the rules of statutory

306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.

Id. at 867, 826 S.E.2d at 686.
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2 (2019).
Astor, 349 Ga. App. at 867–68, 826 S.E.2d at 686–87.
Id. at 868, 826 S.E.2d at 687.
Id. at 871, 826 S.E.2d at 688.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-1 (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) (2019).
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(.1) (2019).
Astor, 349 Ga. App. at 869, 826 S.E.2d at 688.
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construction, the court concluded that a foreclosure sale is an arm’s
length, bona fide sale.316

316. Id. at 868–70, 826 S.E.2d at 687–88 (emphasis omitted).

